International Journal of Education and Management Engineering(IJEME)

ISSN: 2305-3623 (Print), ISSN: 2305-8463 (Online)

Published By: MECS Press

IJEME Vol.1, No.2, Aug. 2011

Game Analysis on Technology Innovation Purchase under Complete Information

Full Text (PDF, 172KB), PP.62-66

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Zhang Guoliang, Li Fengxiang

Index Terms

Complete Information; Innovative Technology; Game; Strategy; Benefits


In the fierce market competition, technological innovation becomes a crucial element which effects the sustainable development of enterprises. That enterprises buy technology from the external could save limited resources, so more resources could be put into core business. The external purchase of innovative technology is essentially the results of the game between enterprise and innovative research institutions. The two players in the game analyze counterpart’s policy to choose the best strategy to achieve the greatest benefits.

Cite This Paper

Zhang Guoliang, Li Fengxiang,"Game Analysis on Technology Innovation Purchase under Complete Information", IJEME, vol.1, no.2, pp.62-66, 2011.


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