International Journal of Intelligent Systems and Applications (IJISA)
IJISA Vol. 8, No. 11, 8 Nov. 2016
Cover page and Table of Contents: PDF (size: 668KB)
Agent-Based Buyer-Trader Interaction Model of Traditional Markets
Full Text (PDF, 668KB), PP.1-8
Views: 0 Downloads: 0
Author(s)
Purba D. Kusuma
1,2,*
Azhar Niaz
1
Reza Pulungan
1
Index Terms
Interaction model, negotiation, multi-agent system, traditional market
Abstract
One problem in simulating crowds in traditional markets is calculating the interaction duration between traders and buyers. This problem can be solved in a simple way by doing field observation to obtain some samples to find the average interaction duration between traders and buyers. This method is simple. On the other hand, the result will be less valid if the parameters are change. The purpose of this research is to develop an interaction model between traders and buyers by looking deeper into the negotiation process. This model is developed based on multi-agent system. Output of this model is the interaction duration. This model has been implemented in a traditional market crowd simulation. Based on the simulation, by adjusting the parameters in this model, the interaction duration by the model matches the real condition in traditional markets.
Cite This Paper
Purba D. Kusuma, Azhari, Reza Pulungan, "Agent-Based Buyer-Trader Interaction Model of Traditional Markets", International Journal of Intelligent Systems and Applications (IJISA), Vol.8, No.11, pp.1-8, 2016. DOI:10.5815/ijisa.2016.11.01
Reference
[1]M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, “Bargaining and Market”, San Diego Academic Press, 1990.
[2]A. Rubinstein, “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”, Econometrica vol. 50, no. 1, 1982, pp. 97-110.
[3]R.M. Coehoorn and N.R. Jennings, “Learning on Opponent’s Preferences to Make Effective Multi Issue Negotiation Trade Offs”, Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Electronic Commerce, ACM (Delft), 2004, pp. 59-68.
[4]S. Balakrishnan and J. Eliashberg, “An Analytical Process Model of Two-Party Negotiations”, Management Science, vol. 41, no. 2, 1995, pp. 226-243.
[5]T. Alfredson and A. Cungu, “Negotiation Theory and Practice”, EasyPol, 2008.
[6]G.N. Herman, J.M. Cary, and J.E. Kennedy, “Legal Counseling and Negotiating: A Practical Approach”, Matthew Bender and Company, 2001.
[7]R. Fisher, W. Ury, and B. Patton, “Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without Giving in”, Random House Business Books, 1991.
[8]W.L. Adair and J.M. Brett, “The Negotiation Dance: Time, Culture, and Behavioral Sequences in Negotiation”, Organization Science, vol. 16, no. 1, 2005, pp.33-51.
[9]Y. Shoham and K. Leyton-Brown, “Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations”, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[10]A.E. Roth and J.K. Murnighan, “The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study”, Econometrica, vol. 50, no. 5, 1982, pp.1123-1142.
[11]M. Wooldridge, “An Introduction to Multi Agent System”, John Wiley and Sons, 2002.
[12]G. Weiss, L. Braubach, and P. Giorgini, “Intelligent Agent”, Handbook of Technology Management, Wiley, 2010.
[13]Y. Chevaleyre, U. Endriss, and N. Maudet, “On Maximal Classes of Utility Functions for Efficient One-to-One Negotiation”, The 19th International Joint Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2005, pp.941-946.
[14]F. Shaheen, M. Wooldridge, and N.R. Jennings, “Optimal Negotiation of Multiple Issues in Incomplete Information Settings”, The 3rd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agent and Multi Agent Systems, 2004, pp. 1080-1087.
[15]C. Ponsati and J. Watson, “Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions”, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 26, no. 4, 1997, pp.501-524.
[16]A. Rangaswamy and G.R. Shell, “Using Computer to Realize Joint Gains in Negotiations: Toward and Electronic Bargaining Table”, Management Science, vol. 43, no. 8, 1997, pp. 1147-1163.
[17]M. Bac and H. Raff, “Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference”, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 13, no. 1, 1996, pp. 125-134.
[18]M.K. Chen, “Agendas in Multi-Issue Bargaining: When to Sweat the Small Stuff”, Harvard Department of Economics, Cambridge, Nov 2002, technical report.
[19]Y. In, and R. Serrano, “Agenda Restrictions in Multi Issue Bargaining”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 53, no. 3, 2004, pp. 325-331.
[20]K.G. Binmore, “Bargaining and Coalitions”, Disagreement in Bargaining: Model with Incomplete Information, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.269-304.
[21]S. Hart, “Axiomatic Approaches to Coalitional Bargaining”, Disagreement in Bargaining: Model with Incomplete Information, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.305-319.
[22]R.B. Myerson, “Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information”, Disagreement in Bargaining: Model with Incomplete Information, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.115-147.
[23]J.Y. Kim, “Cheap Talk and Reputation in Repeated Pre-trial Negotiation”, Journal of Economics, vol.27, no. 4, 1996, pp.787-802.
[24]T. Nagle and R. Holden, “The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing: A Guide to Profitable Decision Making”, Prentice Hall, 2002.
[25]G.B. Sproles and E.L. Kendall, “A Methodology for Profiling Consumers’ Decision Making Styles”, The Journal of Consumer Affairs, vol.20, 1986, pp.267-279.
[26]W. Applebaum, “Studying Customer Behavior in Retail Stores”, Journal of Marketing, vol. 16, no. 2, 1951, pp.172-178.
[27]S. Wesley, M. LeHew, and A.G. Woodside, “Consumer Decision-Making Styles and Mall Shopping Behavior: Building Theory Using Exploratory Data Analysis and The Comparative Method”, Journal of Business Research, vol.59, no. 5, 2006, pp.535-548.
[28]D.W. Rook, “The Buying Impulse”, The Journal of Consumer Research, vol.14, no. 2, 1987, pp.189-199.
[29]A. Kruzka, “Why did I Just Buy That? A Look at Impulse Buying in The Atmosphere of Daily Deal”, American University, 2012.
[30]D.T. Kollat and R.P. Willett, “Customer Impulse Purchasing Behavior”, Journal of Marketing Research, vol.4, no. 1, 1967, pp.21-31.