INFORMATION CHANGE THE WORLD

International Journal of Wireless and Microwave Technologies(IJWMT)

ISSN: 2076-1449 (Print), ISSN: 2076-9539 (Online)

Published By: MECS Press

IJWMT Vol.1, No.2, Apr. 2011

An Incentive Compatible Reputation Model for P2P Networks

Full Text (PDF, 440KB), PP.62-69


Views:47   Downloads:1

Author(s)

Jianli Hu,Bin Zhou

Index Terms

P2P; reputation model; incentive compatible mechanism; recommendation credibility

Abstract

An important challenge regarding peer's trust assessment in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks is how to cope with such issues as the fraudulent behaviors and the dishonest feedback behaviors from malicious peers, and the issue of inactive recommendations to others. However, these issues cannot be effectively addressed by the existing solutions. Thus, an incentive compatible reputation management model for P2P networks, named ICRM, is proposed to solve them. In ICRM, the metric of time zone is used to describe the time property of the transaction experience and the recommendation. Three other metrics such as the direct trust value, the recommendation trust value and the recommendation credibility, based on the metric of time zone are applied to express accurately the final trust level of a peer. Furthermore, the participating level is introduced as the metric to identify a peer's activeness degree. Theoretical analysis and simulation experiments demonstrate that, ICRM can effectively suppress the malicious behaviors such as providing unreliable services, or giving dishonest feedbacks to others in the P2P networks. What's more, it also can incent peers to offer recommendations to others more actively.

Cite This Paper

Jianli Hu,Bin Zhou,"An Incentive Compatible Reputation Model for P2P Networks", IJWMT, vol.1, no.2, pp.62-69, 2011.

Reference

[1]Kamwar S. D., Schlosser M. T., Hector Garcia-Molina. The eigentrust algorithm for reputation manage-ment in P2P networks [C]. Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on World Wide Web. Buda-pest, Hungary, 2003: 640-651

[2]Xiong L, Liu L. PeerTrust: Supporting reputation-based trust in peer-to-peer communities [J]. IEEE Transactions on Data and Knowledge Engineering , Special Issue on Peer-to-Peer Based Data Manage ment , 2004, 16(7): 843-857

[3]C Dellarocas. Immunizing online reputation reporting systems against unfair ratings and discriminatory behavior [C]. Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. Minneapolis, MN, USA, 2000: 150-157

[4]Xiong L., Liu L. A reputation-based trust model for peer-to-peer ecommerce communities [C]. Proceed-ings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce (CEC'03), San Diego, CA, US, ACM Press 2003: 228-229

[5]Wang Y., Vassileva J. Bayesian Network-Based Trust Model in P2P Networks [C]. Proceedings of Agents and Peer-to-Peer Computing, Second International Workshop (AP2PC 2003), Melbourne, Australia, IEEE Computer Society. 2003: 372-378

[6]Golle P, Leyton-Brown K, Mironov I. Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks. In: Wellman MP, Shoham Y, eds. Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce. New York: ACM Press, 2001: 264-267

[7]Buragohain C, Agrawal D, Suri S. A game theoretic framework for incentives in P2P systems. In: Shahmehri N, Graham RL, Carroni G, eds. Proceedings of the 3rd Int'l Conf. on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P 2003). Los Alamitos: IEEE Press, 2003: 48-56

[8]Friedman E and Resnick P. The social cost of cheap pseudonyms [J]. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2001, 10(2): 173-199