International Journal of Computer Network and Information Security (IJCNIS)
IJCNIS Vol. 7, No. 6, 8 May 2015
Cover page and Table of Contents: PDF (size: 471KB)
Correlation Power Analysis using Measured and Simulated Power Traces based on Hamming Distance Power Model – Attacking 16-bit Integer Multiplier in FPGA
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Author(s)
Marek Repka
1,*
Michal Varchola
2
Index Terms
Side Channel Attack, Side Channel Attack Simulations, Correlation Power Analysis, Hamming Distance Power Model, Digital Signature Algorithm, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
Abstract
In many cases side channel attacks complexity are estimated by considering attack simulations only. Regarding this estimations, parameters of cryptographic devices are set so the attack is infeasible. This work shows that this approach to secure cryptographic equipment can be dangerous because real attacks can be much better than expected according to simulations. This observation is presented on very generic Correlation Power Attack using Hamming Distance Power Model. This attack is aimed against integer multiplier implemented in FPGA. In cryptography, an integer multiplier power consumption can sometimes be exploited to reveal a secret. Very often it is in asymmetric cryptography that is used in PKI as a fundamental building block. As an example, there are DSA and its various derivations.
Cite This Paper
Marek Repka, Michal Varchola, "Correlation Power Analysis using Measured and Simulated Power Traces based on Hamming Distance Power Model – Attacking 16-bit Integer Multiplier in FPGA", International Journal of Computer Network and Information Security(IJCNIS), vol.7, no.6, pp.10-16, 2015. DOI:10.5815/ijcnis.2015.06.02
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