Lei Wang

International Journal of Engineering and Manufacturing (IJEM)

IJEM Vol. 2, No. 4, 29 Aug. 2012

Cover page and Table of Contents: PDF (size: 306KB)

Comparative Analysis for the Equilibrium Bidding Strategies of the Standard Auction Based on the Revenue Equivalence Principle

Full Text (PDF, 306KB), PP.67-73

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Author(s)

Lei Wang ^1,2,*

1. Institute of System Engineering, University of Wuhan, Wuhan, Hubei Province, China

2. School of Economics, University of Guizhou, Guiyang, Guizhou Province, China

* Corresponding author.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5815/ijem.2012.04.09

Received: 28 Apr. 2012 / Revised: 20 Jun. 2012 / Accepted: 25 Jul. 2012 / Published: 29 Aug. 2012

Index Terms

Revenue equivalence principle, standard auction, equilibrium bidding strategy, incentive compatibility

Abstract

It has analyzed the transition processes for the content of the revenue equivalence principle. It used the revenue equivalence principle to derive the equilibrium bidding strategies in the first, second and third price auction and the all-pay auction from the expected payment of the bidders. Based on this, it compared the equilibrium bidding strategies in the four auction forms and got some useful conclusions.

Cite This Paper

Lei Wang,"Comparative Analysis for the Equilibrium Bidding Strategies of the Standard Auction Based on the Revenue Equivalence Principle", IJEM, vol.2, no.4, pp.67-73, 2012. DOI: 10.5815/ijem.2012.04.09

Reference

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